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We study subgame φ-maxmin strategies in two-player zero-sum stochastic games with
finite action spaces and a countable state space. Here φ denotes the tolerance function, a
function which assigns a non-negative tolerated error level to every subgame. Subgame φ-
maxmin strategies are strategies of the maximizing player that guarantee the lower value in
every subgame within the subgame-dependent tolerance level as given by φ. First, we provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be a subgame φ-maxmin strategy. As a
special case we obtain a characterization for subgame maxmin strategies, i.e. strategies that
exactly guarantee the lower value at every subgame. Secondly, we present sufficient conditions
for the existence of a subgame φ-maxmin strategy. Finally, we show the possibly surprising
result that the existence of subgame φ-maxmin strategies for every positive tolerance function
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1 Introduction
Two-player zero-sum stochastic games model the repeated interaction between two agents
with opposite objectives. The environment in which the interaction takes place is fully char-
acterized by a state variable. The transition from one state variable to the next one is
influenced by both players as well as an element of chance. Throughout the paper we take
the perspective of the maximizing player. We are interested in strategies of the maximizing
player that guarantee the lower value at every subgame and call such strategies subgame
maxmin strategies. Under the assumptions as made in the paper, the value may not exist,
which explains why we consider the lower value instead.
As the name subgame maxmin strategy suggests, this concept is closely related to the
concept of a subgame perfect equilibrium as defined in Selten (1965). In two-player zero-sum
games where the value exists, for conditions see Maitra and Sudderth (1998) and Martin
(1998), the notions of a subgame maxmin strategy and a subgame minmax strategy coincide
with the notion of a subgame optimal strategy. Moreover, in such games a strategy profile is a
subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if it consists of a pair of subgame optimal strategies.
As illustrated by the Big Match, a game introduced in Gillette (1957) and analyzed in
Blackwell and Ferguson (1968), even if the value exists, it is not guaranteed that optimal
strategies exist, so a fortiori, subgame optimal strategies and subgame perfect equilibria may
not exist. A large part of the literature therefore focuses on so-called subgame perfect -
equilibria as defined in Radner (1980). This equilibrium concept is more permissive than a
subgame perfect equilibrium and consists of a strategy pair such that every player obtains
the value at each history up to a fixed error term of /2.
Instead of having a fixed error term at each subgame, we allow the error term to vary
across different subgames. This error term is expressed as a function φ of the histories and
is called the tolerance function. The central topic of this paper is the concept of a subgame
φ-maxmin strategy. This is a strategy of the maximizing player that guarantees the lower
value at every subgame within the allowed tolerance level. Intuitively, a subgame φ-maxmin
strategy performs sufficiently well across all subgames. This type of strategy is related to the
concept of φ-tolerance equilibrium as defined in Flesch and Predtetchinski (2016). Indeed, if
the value exists, then a strategy profile in which both players use a subgame (φ/2)-optimal
strategy is a φ-tolerance equilibrium.
One motivation for letting the tolerance level vary across subgames is given by Mailath,
Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2005) when introducing the concept of a contemporaneous per-
fect -equilibrium. The authors focus on games in which the payoff function of the players
is given by the discounted sum of periodic rewards. Due to this discounting, there exists a
period after which the maximal total discounted reward a player can receive is smaller than .
If the allowed tolerance level  is fixed across all subgames, any strategy will be an -maxmin
strategy of a subgame in such a period. Therefore, the concept of subgame -maxmin strategy
does not impose any restrictions on the actions chosen at a very distant future. The issue
here is that it would be more intuitive to discount not only the reward but also the allowed
tolerance level.
Additional motivation for letting the tolerance level vary across subgames stems from the
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fact that the notion of what is considered sufficiently good might be relative. For instance,
Tversky and Kahneman (1985) observe that people evaluate decisions with respect to a ref-
erence level. They find that significantly more people were willing to exert extra effort to
save $5 on a $15 purchase than to save $5 on a $125 purchase. To apply this to the context
of zero-sum games, consider the following game to which we will refer as the high stakes-low
stakes game. In the first stage of the game, a chance move determines whether the player
will engage in the high stakes or the low stakes variant of this game. The high stakes and
the low stakes games are identical in terms of possible strategies. The only difference is that
the payoffs in the high stakes game are a thousand fold the payoffs in the low stakes game.
Furthermore, assume that in the high stakes subgame the payoff of player 1 ranges between
0 and 2000 and the value is 1000, while in the low stakes subgame the payoff of player 1
ranges between 0 and 2 and the value is 1. Players that evaluate decisions with respect to a
reference level, may label a strategy which guarantees a payoff of 999 in the high stakes game
as sufficiently good. However, in the low stakes game, 0 corresponds to the minimum payoff.
Allowing the tolerance level to vary across subgames can therefore be used to accommodate
such behavioral effects into the model of zero-sum stochastic games.
Another case where history dependent tolerance levels are natural is the following. In
situations that commonly occur, a player may use a familiar strategy irrespective of the scale
of the payoffs. To understand this better, imagine a player who is highly experienced in
playing a certain zero-sum game. He has a trusted strategy which guarantees him the value
of this game within some error. Now consider the high stakes-low stakes game again. The
player might well use the trusted strategy in both the low stakes and the high stakes subgame.
Therefore the error related to this strategy will be relative with respect to the value of the
respective subgame.
Finally, in the class of stochastic games as identified in Flesch, Thuijsman and Vrieze
(1998), the only way to obtain -optimality is to use strategies that are called improving. Im-
proving strategies are closely related to subgame φ-maxmin strategies such that the tolerance
level in some subgames is smaller than the tolerance level at the root.
With respect to the concept of subgame φ-maxmin strategies, this paper attempts to
provide answers to the following three fundamental questions:
1. What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be a subgame φ-
maxmin strategy?
2. For positive tolerance functions φ, when does a subgame φ-maxmin strategy exist?
3. When does a subgame maxmin strategy exist?
The first question concerning the necessary and sufficient conditions for subgame φ-
maxmin strategies is answered in Section 4. As a special case of these necessary and sufficient
conditions, we obtain a characterization of subgame maxmin strategies. For the special class
of positive and negative stochastic games, a related characterization of subgame maxmin
strategies was obtained by Flesch, Predtetchinski and Sudderth (2018).
The necessary and sufficient conditions for strategies to be subgame φ-maxmin can be
split into a local condition and an equalizing condition. Informally, the local condition states
that the lower value one expects to get in the next subgame should always be at least the
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lower value of the current subgame. The equalizing condition requires that, for every strategy
of the other player, a subgame φ-maxmin strategy almost surely results in a play with an
eventually good enough payoff, where eventually good enough means being at least the lower
value in very deep subgames up to the allowed tolerance level.
The second and third question regarding the existence of subgame φ-maxmin strategies
are examined in Sections 5 and 6. In Section 5 we consider positive tolerance functions.
The existence of subgame maxmin strategies is discussed in Section 6. The existence and
construction of such strategies is important as they can serve as punishment strategies in
multi-player games. This is illustrated in the paper of Mashiah-Yaakovi (2015).
We prove that for a positive tolerance function φ, a subgame φ-maxmin strategy exists if
every play is either a point of upper semicontinuity of the payoff function or if the sequence of
tolerance levels which occur along the play has a positive lower bound. We give a constructive
proof of this statement using the sufficient conditions for a strategy to be subgame φ-maxmin.
A special case of our theorem, where the sequence of tolerance levels which occur along
the play always has a positive lower bound, has been studied in Mashiah-Yaakovi (2015).
In Proposition 11 of that paper, the existence of a subgame -optimal strategy in a two-
player zero-sum stochastic game with Borel measurable payoff functions, finite action sets,
and a countable state space has been shown. A subgame -optimal strategy corresponds to a
constant tolerance function that is everywhere equal to .
Our main result in Section 6 states that the existence of a subgame φ-maxmin strategy
for every positive tolerance function φ is equivalent to the existence of a subgame maxmin
strategy. For upper semi-continuous payoff functions, our theorem in Section 5 guarantees
the existence of a subgame φ-maxmin strategy for every positive tolerance function φ, so it
follows that a subgame maxmin strategy exists if the payoff function is upper semi-continuous.
The latter conclusion is related to a result in Laraki, Maitra and Sudderth (2013).
The connection between existence of subgame φ-maxmin strategies for every positive tol-
erance function φ and the existence of subgame maxmin strategies is not only useful to further
understand the results obtained by Laraki, Maitra and Sudderth (2013) but also highlights an
important and surprising difference between subgame φ-maxmin strategies and the closely re-
lated concept of subgame -maxmin strategies. Indeed, the existence of a subgame -maxmin
strategy for every  > 0 does not imply the existence of a subgame maxmin strategy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we formulate the model setup
and in Section 3 we formally define the main concepts. Then in Section 4 we discuss the
necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be a subgame φ-maxmin strategy and
give a characterization for subgame maxmin strategies. We continue in Section 5 by providing
sufficient conditions to guarantee the existence of a subgame φ-maxmin strategy. Then in
Section 6 we explain why the existence of subgame φ-maxmin strategies for every positive
tolerance function φ is equivalent to existence of a subgame maxmin strategy. Finally, in
Section 7 we discuss the importance of the assumptions we made and whether they might be
relaxed.
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2 Two-player zero-sum stochastic games
We consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic game with finitely many actions and countably
many states. The payoff function is required to be bounded and universally measurable. The
model encompasses all two-player zero-sum games with perfect information and stochastic
moves.
Actions, states, and histories: The action sets of players 1 and 2 are given by the finite
sets A and B, respectively. The state space is given by the countable set X . Let x0 denote
the initial state and define the set Z = A×B×X . The game consists of an infinite sequence
of one-shot games. At the initial state x0, the one-shot game G(x0) is played as follows:
Players 1 and 2 simultaneously select an action from their respective action sets, denoted
by a1 and b1, respectively. Then the next state x1 is selected according to the transition
probability q(·|x0, a1, b1). At the new state x1, this process repeats itself and both players
play the one-shot game G(x1) by selecting actions a2 and b2 from their respective action sets.
The next state x2 is selected according to the transition probability q(·|x0, a1, b1, x1, a2, b2).
This goes on indefinitely and creates a play p = (x0, a1, b1, x1, a2, b2, · · · ). Note that the
transition probability can depend on the entire history.
For every t ∈ N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, let Ht = {x0} × Zt denote the set of all histories that are
generated after t one-shot games. The set H0 consists of the single element x0. For t ≥ 1,
elements of Ht are of the form (x0, a1, b1, . . . , at, bt, xt). Let H = ∪t∈NHt denote the set of
all histories. For all h ∈ H, let ‖h‖ = ‖(x0, a1, b1, . . . , at, bt, xt)‖ = t denote the number of
one-shot games that occurred during the history h. We refer to ‖h‖ as the length of the
history h. For all t ≤ ‖h‖, the restriction of the history h to the first t one-shot games is
denoted by h|t = (x0, a1, b1, . . . , at, bt, xt). We write h′  h if there exists t ≤ ‖h‖ such that
h|t = h′, so if the history h extends the history h′.
The space of plays: Define P = {x0} × ZN to be the set of plays. Elements of P are of
the form p = (x0, a1, b1, x1, a2, b2, · · · ). For t ∈ N, let p|t denote the prefix of p of length t:
that is p|0 = x0 and p|t = (x0, a1, b1, . . . , at, bt, xt) for t ≥ 1. We write h ≺ p if a history h is
a prefix of p. For every h ∈ H, let P(h) = {p ∈ P|h ≺ p} denote the cylinder set consisting
of all plays which extend history h.
We endow Z with the discrete topology and P with the product topology. The collection
of all cylinder sets is a basis for the product topology on P.
For t ∈ N, let F t be the sigma-algebra generated by the collection of cylinder sets {P(h) |
h ∈ Ht}. Each set in F t can be written as the union of sets in {P(h) | h ∈ Ht}. Let F∞ be
the sigma-algebra generated by ∪t∈NF t. This is exactly the Borel sigma-algebra generated
by the product topology on P. The sigma-algebra of universally measurable subsets of P is
denoted by F . Elements of F are sets that belong to the completion of each Borel probability
measure on P. For details of the definition of the sigma-algebra F , the reader is referred to
Appendix A. It holds that F t ⊆ F t+1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ F∞ ⊆ F . The set of plays P together with the
universally measurable sigma-algebra F determines a measurable space (P,F). A stochastic
variable is a universally measurable function from P to R.
Strategies: Let ∆(A) denote the set of probability measures over the action set of player 1
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and ∆(B) the set of probability measures over the action set of player 2. A behavioral strategy
for player 1 is a function σ : H → ∆(A). Hence, at each history player 1 chooses a mixed
action. A pure strategy for player 1 is a function that assigns to every history an action, with
a minor abuse of notation, σ : H → A. Similarly, one can define a behavioral and a pure
strategy τ for player 2. Let S1 and S2 denote the sets of behavioral strategies of players 1
and 2, respectively.
It follows from the Ionescu Tulcea extension theorem that every history h ∈ H and strategy
profile (σ, τ) ∈ S1 × S2 determine a probability measure Ph,σ,τ on the measurable space
(P(h),F∞P(h)), where F∞P(h) denotes the Borel sigma-algebra over the set of plays extending
the history h. The measure Ph,σ,τ can be extended to the measurable space (P,F∞) in
the obvious way. Taking the completion of the probability space (P,F∞,Ph,σ,τ ) yields the
probability space (P,F ,PCh,σ,τ ). With a minor abuse of notation, we will omit the superscript
C and write Ph,σ,τ in the remainder of this paper.
Payoff function: We assume that the payoff function u : P → R of player 1 is bounded
and universally measurable. We also assume the game to be zero-sum. The payoff function
of player 2 is therefore given by −u. We denote the game as described above by Γx0(u).
Throughout the paper we take the point of view of player 1. This is without loss of generality,
since the situation of Player 2 in the game Γx0(u) is identical to that of Player 1 in the game
Γx0(−u).
The expected payoff of player 1 corresponding to strategy profile (σ, τ) ∈ S1×S2 at history
h ∈ H is given by Eh,σ,τ [u] , where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability
measure Ph,σ,τ . The expected payoff of player 1 at the history x0 is denoted by Eσ,τ [u].
Unlike two-player zero-sum stochastic games with Borel measurable payoff functions, two-
player zero-sum stochastic games with universally measurable payoff functions do not neces-
sarily have a value, formally defined in Section 3. The core idea of this paper, the construction
and existence of strategies that perform sufficiently well in every subgame, is independent of
the problem of the existence of a value. The reader unfamiliar with universally measurable
payoff functions may therefore imagine Borel measurable payoff functions throughout the
paper.
3 Subgame φ-maxmin strategies
For every game Γx0(u), for every history h ∈ H, we define the lower value v(h) and the upper
value v(h) by
v(h) = sup
σ∈S1
inf
τ∈S2
Eh,σ,τ [u] , (3.1)
v(h) = inf
τ∈S2
sup
σ∈S1
Eh,σ,τ [u] . (3.2)
Because the payoff function u is assumed to be bounded, we have that v(h), v(h) ∈ R.
Therefore, the lower and upper value exist in every subgame of Γx0(u). Furthermore, we have
that v(h) ≤ v(h). Whenever v(h) = v(h) we say that the subgame at history h has a value
and we denote it by v(h). The lower value, the upper value, and the value at the initial state
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Figure 1: Characterization of φ such that pure subgame φ-maxmin strategies exist.
x0 are denoted by v, v, and v, respectively. If u is Borel measurable, then the value exists
by Maitra and Sudderth (1998) and Martin (1998). Since we do not assume u to be Borel
measurable, we present our results in terms of the lower value.
Even if the value exists, player 1 may not have a strategy that guarantees the value in
each subgame and the literature has therefore studied subgame -optimal strategies. These
are strategies which guarantee the value in each subgame up to an allowed error term of
. If the payoff function is bounded and Borel measurable, it has been shown by Mashiah-
Yaakovi (2015) that for each  > 0 player 1 has a subgame -optimal strategy. The concept
of a subgame -optimal strategy has a constant error term  across all subgames. However,
as argued in the introduction, there are instances in which it is more natural to consider
a variable error term. Therefore, instead of considering a constant error term, we follow
Flesch and Predtetchinski (2016), who allow the error term to vary across histories in their
investigation of the φ-tolerance equilibrium. This leads us to the study of subgame φ-maxmin
strategies, where φ : H → [0,∞) is a tolerance function assigning an allowed tolerance level
to each history.
Definition 3.1. Let φ : H → [0,∞) be a tolerance function. A strategy σ ∈ S1 is a subgame
φ-maxmin strategy in the game Γx0(u) if for every history h ∈ H it holds that
∀τ ∈ S2, Eh,σ,τ [u] ≥ v(h)− φ(h). (3.3)
In case φ is identically equal to zero, we omit it from the notation, and simply refer to a
subgame maxmin strategy.
A subgame φ-maxmin strategy guarantees at each history h of the game the lower value
up to the tolerance level φ(h). If the tolerance function is such that, for some  ≥ 0, for every
h ∈ H, φ(h) = , then we refer to the strategy as a subgame -maxmin strategy. If the value
exists, then the notion of subgame -maxmin strategy coincides with the notion of subgame
-optimal strategy.
The following example illustrates that even for a strictly positive tolerance function φ
player 1 may have no subgame φ-maxmin strategies. Interestingly, however, player 1 has a
subgame -maxmin strategy for every positive  > 0.
Example 3.2. The decision problem depicted in Figure 1 corresponds to a two-player zero-
sum stochastic game in which the state space is trivial and the second player is a dummy
player. Whenever the state space or action sets are degenerate, the corresponding states and
actions are omitted from the notation in examples. The set of actions of player 1 is A = {c, q},
where c stands for continue and q for quit. The game stops as soon as player 1 chooses to
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quit. If player 1 decides to quit at period t, then his payoff is t/(t + 1). If player 1 never
quits, his payoff is 0.
In this game, player 1 has a subgame -maxmin strategy for every positive  > 0. For
example, the strategy which quits whenever quitting leads to a payoff of at least 1− .
We now turn to the existence of a subgame φ-maxmin strategy. Clearly, there exist no
subgame maxmin strategy. As we will see later, Theorem 6.1 then implies that there is some
strictly positive tolerance function φ for which there does not exist a subgame φ-maxmin
strategy. Intuitively, such a tolerance function forces player 1 to continue with such a large
probability that the total probability of never quitting becomes nearly one.
In the remainder of this example we focus on pure strategies and we provide a charac-
terization of tolerance functions φ for which there is a pure subgame φ-maxmin strategy.
Claim: There exists a pure subgame φ-maxmin strategy if and only if
1. for every t ∈ N, φ(ct) > 0,
2. for infinitely many t ∈ N, φ′(ct) = min
n≤t
φ(cn) ≥ 1t+1 .
Proof: For every t ∈ N, the value v(ct) exists and is equal to 1. Hence any pure subgame
φ-maxmin strategy σ has the property that, for every t ∈ N, u(pi(σ, ct)) ≥ 1 − φ(ct), where
pi(σ, ct) denotes the play induced from history ct when using strategy σ.
⇒ Because a payoff of exactly 1 can never be reached it is clear that φ(ct) > 0 for every
t ∈ N.
Let σ be a pure subgame φ-maxmin strategy. We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: For every t ∈ N, σ(ct) = c. For every t ∈ N it holds that u(pi(σ, ct)) = u(c∞) = 0.
Because σ is a subgame φ-maxmin strategy, we find that, for every t ∈ N, φ(ct) ≥ 1, so
φ′(ct) = minn≤t φ(cn) ≥ 1 ≥ 1/(t+ 1).
Case 2: The number of t ∈ N such that σ(ct) = q is positive and finite. Consider the
increasing sequence of times (tk)k=0,...,k′ at which σ(c
tk) = q. For t ∈ {0, . . . , t0}, we have that
u(pi(σ, ct)) = u(ct0q) = t0t0+1 ,
so φ(ct) ≥ 1/(t0 + 1) since σ is a subgame φ-maxmin strategy. We find that
φ′(t0) = min
t∈{0,...,t0}
φ(t) ≥ 1t0+1 .
We argue next that if, for some k ≥ 1, tk−1 and tk are quitting times, then mint∈{tk−1+1,...,tk} φ(ct) ≥
1/(tk + 1). Indeed, for t ∈ {tk−1 + 1, . . . , tk} we have that
u(pi(σ, ct)) = u(ctkq) = tktk+1 ,
so φ(ct) ≥ 1/(tk + 1) since σ is a subgame φ-maxmin strategy. Using induction, we find for
k = 1, . . . , k′ that
φ′(ctk) ≥ min{φ′(ctk−1), 1tk+1} ≥ 1tk+1 .
8
For every t > tk
′
it holds that σ(ct) = c and u(pi(σ, ct)) = u(c∞) = 0. For every t > tk′ , since
σ is a subgame φ-maxmin strategy, we have φ(ct) ≥ 1, so
φ′(ct) ≥ min{φ′(ctk
′
), 1} ≥ 1
tk′+1
> 1t+1 ,
which concludes this case.
Case 3: The number of t ∈ N such that σ(ct) = q is infinite. Consider the increasing
sequence of times (tk)k∈N at which σ(ctk) = q. As in Case 2 it can be shown that for every
k ∈ N it holds that φ′(ctk) ≥ 1/(tk + 1).
⇐ Let the strategy σ be defined as follows. For t ∈ N,
σ(ct) =
{
q, if φ′(ct) ≥ 1t+1 ,
c, otherwise.
(3.4)
We show first that σ is a subgame φ′-maxmin strategy. For every t ∈ N, there exists t′ ≥ t such
that φ′(ct′) ≥ 1/(t′ + 1). Take the minimal t′ with this property. We have that u(pi(σ, ct)) =
u(ct
′
q) = t′/(t′ + 1). Because φ′ is a non-increasing function, we have that
1− φ′(ct) ≤ 1− φ′(ct′) ≤ 1− 1t′+1 = t
′
t′+1 = u(pi(σ, c
t)).
We conclude that σ is a subgame φ′-maxmin strategy. Because, for every t ∈ N, φ′(ct) ≤ φ(ct),
the strategy σ is a subgame φ-maxmin strategy as well. ♦
To identify subgame φ-maxmin strategies, it is useful to define the function u : S1×H → R
by
u(σ, h) = inf
τ∈S2
Eh,σ,τ [u] . (3.5)
The payoff u(σ, h) corresponds to the guarantee level that player 1 is expected to receive at
history h when playing the strategy σ. A strategy σ ∈ S1 is called a φ(h)-maxmin strategy
for the subgame at history h if u(σ, h) ≥ v(h)− φ(h).
For every strategy profile (σ, τ) ∈ S1 × S2, for every t ∈ N, define the stochastic variables
U tσ,τ , U
t
σ, and V
t by letting U tσ,τ (p) = Ep|t,σ,τ [u], U
t
σ(p) = u(σ, p|t), and V
t(p) = v(p|t),
respectively, for each play p ∈ P. All three stochastic variables are F t-measurable. We have
U tσ ≤ U tσ,τ and U tσ ≤ V t everywhere on P.
The next lemma states the submartingale property of guarantee levels. It says that the
guarantee level that player 1 can expect to receive increases over time.
Lemma 3.3. (Submartingale property of guarantee levels) Let a strategy profile (σ, τ) ∈
S1 × S2, t ∈ N, and a history h ∈ Ht of length t be given.
[1] It holds that u(σ, h) ≤ Eh,σ,τ [U t+1σ ].
[2] The process (U t+nσ )n∈N is a Ph,σ,τ -submartingale.
Proof. Take δ > 0. Let τ ′ ∈ S2 be such that τ ′(h) = τ(h) and for each (a, b, x) ∈ Z it holds
that
E(h,a,b,x),σ,τ ′ [u] ≤ u(σ, (h, a, b, x)) + δ.
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We have that
u(σ, h) ≤ Eh,σ,τ ′ [u]
=
∑
(a,b,x)∈Z
σ(h)(a) · τ(h)(b) · q(x|h, a, b) · E(h,a,b,x),σ,τ ′ [u]
≤
∑
(a,b,x)∈Z
σ(h)(a) · τ(h)(b) · q(x|h, a, b) · (u(σ, (h, a, b, x)) + δ)
= Eh,σ,τ [U t+1σ ] + δ.
The first claim follows since δ > 0 is arbitrary.
The second claim follows by Lemma A.1 in Appendix A.
4 Conditions for strategies to be subgame φ-maxmin
4.1 n-Day maxmin strategies and equalizing strategies
The goal of this section is to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be
subgame φ-maxmin and to provide a characterization of subgame maxmin strategies.
Definition 4.1. A strategy σ ∈ S1 is an n-day φ-maxmin strategy in the game Γx0(u) if for
every t ∈ N, for every history h ∈ Ht of length t, and for every strategy τ ∈ S2,
Eh,σ,τ [V t+n] ≥ v(h)− φ(h). (4.1)
Definition 4.2. A strategy σ ∈ S1 is φ-equalizing in the game Γx0(u) if for every t ∈ N, for
every history h ∈ Ht of length t, and for every strategy τ ∈ S2,
u ≥ lim sup
t→∞
V t − φ(h), Ph,σ,τ -almost surely. (4.2)
When φ = 0, we use the terms n-day maxmin and equalizing to mean n-day 0-maxmin
and 0-equalizing, respectively.
The first definition is very intuitive. It says that player 1 should play in such a way that,
on average, the lower value increases over time. The notion of 1-day maxmin strategies is
particularly well known in dynamic programming and stochastic games, see Puterman (1994).
A simple characterization of 1-day maxmin strategies is provided in following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Consider a strategy σ ∈ S1 in the game Γx0(u). The following three conditions
are equivalent:
1. For each n ∈ N, σ is an n-day maxmin strategy.
2. σ is a 1-day maxmin strategy.
3. For each history h ∈ Ht of length t and each strategy τ ∈ S2, the process (V t+n)n∈N is
a Ph,σ,τ -submartingale.
Proof. That [1] implies [2] is obvious. That [2] implies [3] follows by Lemma A.1 in Ap-
pendix A. Finally, that [3] implies [1] follows by the optional sampling theorem.
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Figure 2: Strategies that are n-day maxmin may not be subgame maxmin.
A strategy is φ-equalizing if, roughly speaking, it almost surely results in a play with an
eventually good enough payoff, where eventually good enough means being about as large as
the lower value in very deep subgames.
The following example illustrates both the notion of an n-day maxmin strategy and an
equalizing strategy.
Example 4.4. Consider the centipede game depicted in Figure 2. At every history the active
player can choose to continue (c) or to quit (q). As soon as a player decides to quit the game
ends and in that case the payoff is as given in Figure 2. If the game continues indefinitely then
the payoff is 0. It is easily verified that, for every t ∈ N, v(c2t) = v(c2t+1) = (t+ 1)/(t+ 2).
In what follows we focus our attention on pure strategies and characterize the pure strate-
gies that are n-day maxmin and the pure strategies that are equalizing.
Claim 1: A pure strategy σ ∈ S1 is an n-day maxmin strategy for every n ∈ N if and only if
σ(c2t) = c for every t ∈ N.
Proof: If the active history is a history of player 1, i.e. h = c2t, and player 1 continues every-
where then for any strategy τ ∈ S2 of the second player we have that Eh,σ,τ [V t+1] = v(c2t+1).
If the active history is a history of player 2, i.e. h = c2t+1, then for any strategy τ ∈ S2
of the second player we have that Eh,σ,τ [V t+1] is either u(c2t+1q) or v(c2t+2). Because in
this game the lower value function is non-decreasing and u(c2t+1q) = v(c2t) we have that
Eh,σ,τ [V t+1] ≥ v(h) for every history h ∈ H and every strategy τ ∈ S2. Hence σ is a 1-day
maxmin strategy. Using Theorem 4.3 we conclude that σ is an n-day maxmin strategy for
every n ∈ N.
Conversely, assume there exists a history at which according to the strategy σ player 1
quits. Let c2t denote this history. Then we have for every τ ∈ S2 that Ec2t,σ,τ [V t+1] =
u(c2tq) < v(c2t). We conclude that such a strategy σ cannot be a 1-day maxmin strategy.
Claim 2: A pure strategy σ ∈ S1 is equalizing if and only if for infinitely many t ∈ N it holds
that σ(c2t) = q.
Proof: If for infinitely many t ∈ N it holds that σ(c2t) = q, then for every strategy τ ∈ S2
and every history h ∈ H there exists an n ∈ N such that the play p generated from the history
h under the strategy profile (σ, τ) is cnq. In this case it is clear that lim supt→∞ v(cnq|t) =
u(cnq), which proves that the strategy σ is equalizing.
Conversely, assume σ(c2t) = q for at most finitely many t ∈ N. Then there exists a history
after which player 1 always plays continue. Let h denote this history and let τ ∈ S2 denote
the strategy of the second player in which he always continues. Then the play generated
form the history h under the strategy profile (σ, τ) is c∞. Observing that 0 = u(c∞) <
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lim supt→∞ v(ct) = 1 concludes the proof that any strategy σ in which player 1 quits at most
finitely many times cannot be equalizing.
Consequence: In the centipede game depicted in Figure 2, player 1 does not have a pure
strategy which is both n-day maxmin and equalizing. ♦
The following theorem states sufficient conditions under which a strategy σ of player 1 is
a subgame φ-maxmin strategy.
Theorem 4.5. (Sufficient condition) Let φ : H → [0,∞) be a tolerance function. The strategy
σ ∈ S1 is a subgame φ-maxmin strategy in the game Γx0(u) if there exist tolerance functions
φ1 : H → [0,∞) and φ2 : H → [0,∞) such that φ1 + φ2 ≤ φ and
1. for every n ∈ N, σ is n-day φ1-maxmin,
2. σ is φ2-equalizing.
Proof. Let φ1, φ2, and σ be such that the conditions in the theorem are satisfied. We show
that σ is a subgame φ-maxmin strategy.
Fix a history h ∈ Ht and a strategy τ ∈ S2. Then we have that
v(h)− φ(h) ≤ v(h)− φ1(h)− φ2(h)
≤ lim sup
n→∞
Eh,σ,τ [V t+n]− φ2(h)
≤ Eh,σ,τ [lim sup
n→∞
V t+n]− φ2(h)
≤ Eh,σ,τ [u],
where the second inequality holds since σ is an n-day φ1-maxmin strategy, the third inequality
is by Fatou lemma, and the last inequality holds since σ is φ2-equalizing.
According to Theorem 4.5, to conclude that σ is a subgame φ-maxmin strategy, we should
find tolerance functions φ1 and φ2 such that at each history their sum does not exceed φ and
the strategy σ is both n-day φ1-maxmin and φ2-equalizing.
Particularly natural are situations where the tolerance level does not increase as time
progresses. More formally, the tolerance function φ is said to be non-increasing if φ(h) ≥ φ(h′)
whenever h ≺ h′. The following result states necessary conditions for a strategy to be subgame
φ-maxmin.
Theorem 4.6. (Necessary condition) Let σ ∈ S1 be a subgame φ-maxmin strategy in the
game Γx0(u). Then it holds that:
1. For every n ∈ N, σ is an n-day φ-maxmin strategy.
2. If the tolerance function φ is non-increasing, then σ is φ-equalizing.
Proof. Let σ ∈ S1 be a subgame φ-maxmin strategy in the game Γx0(u). Take a history
h ∈ Ht of length t and a strategy τ ∈ S2.
We prove condition 1. We have
Eh,σ,τ [V t+n] ≥ Eh,σ,τ [U t+nσ ] ≥ Eh,σ,τ [U tσ] = u(σ, h) ≥ v(h)− φ(h),
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Figure 3: A 1-day φ-maxmin strategy may not be n-day φ-maxmin.
where the first inequality holds since for each play p ∈ P(h) we have V t+n(p) = v(p|t+n) ≥
u(σ, p|t+n) = U t+nσ (p). The second inequality holds by Lemma 3.3. The next equation holds
since t is the length of history h, and the final inequality holds since σ is a subgame φ-maxmin
strategy.
We prove condition 2. We have, Ph,σ,τ -almost surely,
u(p) = lim
t→∞Ep|t,σ,τ [u] ≥ lim supt→∞ (v(p|t)− φ(p|t)) ≥ lim supt→∞ V
t(p)− φ(h),
where the equality is by Levy’s zero-one law (Lemma A.2 in Appendix A), the first inequality
follows since σ is a subgame φ-maxmin strategy, and the second inequality holds since φ is
non-increasing.
Notice that in the case of a non-zero tolerance function, the necessary and sufficient
conditions do not coincide and we do not obtain a characterization of subgame φ-maxmin
strategies. We now turn to the case where the tolerance function φ is identically equal to 0.
Corollary 4.7. A strategy σ ∈ S1 is a subgame maxmin strategy in the game Γx0(u) if and
only if it is 1-day maxmin and equalizing.
When we compare the sufficient conditions of Theorem 4.5 to the sufficient conditions
of Corollary 4.7, we notice that in the case of a non-zero tolerance function we require the
strategy to be n-day φ-maxmin. In the case of a zero tolerance function the corresponding
sufficient conditions only require the strategy to be 1-day maxmin. The reason for this
difference is that we should avoid that strategies accumulate the allowed tolerance levels,
causing them to become too permissive over time. The following example illustrates this
issue.
Example 4.8. Consider the decision problem depicted in Figure 3. Each period the decision
maker can choose to continue (c) or to quit (q). Notice that v(ct) = 1/(t + 1) and hence
lim
t→∞ v(c
t) = 0. Any strategy of player 1 is therefore equalizing. Furthermore, it is clear that
in this decision problem the subgame maxmin strategy is unique and requires the decision
maker to quit immediately. Now suppose the decision maker has the following tolerance
function:
φ(ct) = v(ct)− v(ct+1) = 1t+1 − 1t+2 , t ∈ N.
Consider the strategy σ where the decision maker always chooses to continue. From
the definition of the tolerance function it follows that the strategy σ is a 1-day φ-maxmin
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strategy. Indeed, it holds that v(ct+1) ≥ v(ct)− φ(ct). It is also easily seen that the strategy
σ is equalizing. Nevertheless, it is clear that σ is not a subgame φ-maxmin strategy.
The underlying problem with the strategy σ is that every time the decision maker chooses
to continue this causes an acceptable loss in the value, but over time these losses add up to
an unacceptable loss. The requirement that for every n ∈ N a strategy is n-day φ-maxmin
guarantees that the accumulated losses over any finite period of time remain acceptable.
If we require a strategy to be subgame maxmin, then we do not tolerate any losses.
Therefore, the accumulation problem mentioned above will never occur and it will be sufficient
to only require that the strategy is 1-day maxmin. ♦
Example 4.9 is such that player 1 has a maxmin strategy in every subgame, but has no
subgame maxmin strategy. From Corollary 4.7 it follows that any subgame maxmin strategy
needs to be both 1-day maxmin and equalizing. The example presents a game where all the
strategies are 1-day maxmin but none of them is equalizing and therefore subgame maxmin
strategies do not exist.
Example 4.9. Consider the following perfect information game. Both players have two
actions, left (L) and right (R), so A = B = {L,R}. The players take turns playing an
action, which generates a play p ∈ {L,R}N. Let r1(p) and r2(p) denote the number of
times that player 1 and player 2, respectively, play action R during the play p and define
r(p) = min{r1(p), r2(p)}. Player 1 obtains a payoff of 0 if both players choose R infinitely
often. When at least one of them chooses R only a finite number of times, then player 1
receives a payoff of r(p)/(r(p) + 1). The payoff function u is therefore obtained by defining,
for p ∈ {L,R}N ,
u(p) =
{
r(p)
r(p)+1 , if r1(p) 6=∞ or r2(p) 6=∞,
0, if r1(p) = r2(p) =∞.
(4.3)
At each history h ∈ H the value of the game exists and is given by v(h) = r2(h)/(r2(h)+1),
where r2(h) denotes the number of times player 2 has chosen R in the history h. Indeed,
player 1 can guarantee this payoff by choosing the action R max{r2(h)− r1(h), 0} times after
history h. Player 2 can guarantee to lose at most this amount by playing only left after
history h. Hence at every history h ∈ H player 1 has an maxmin strategy.
For every history h ∈ H where player 1 takes an action and for every action a ∈ A we
have that r2(ha) = r2(h) and v(ha) = v(h). Therefore, all strategies of player 1 are 1-day
maxmin.
On the other hand, no equalizing strategy exists. To see this, take any strategy σ ∈ S1 for
player 1 and consider the strategy τ ∈ S2 in which player 2 always chooses R. Let p be the
play generated by the strategy profile (σ, τ). Then we have that u(p) < 1 and lim
t→∞ v(p|t) = 1.
It follows that σ is not equalizing. Using Corollary 4.7 we conclude that player 1 does not
have a subgame maxmin strategy. ♦
Example 4.10. (Non-leavable decision problems) We consider a stochastic decision problem
for player 1, so player 2 is a dummy player. Let r : X → R be a bounded function that
associates a reward to every state. The payoff function u : P → R is defined by
u(x0, a1, x1, a2, . . .) = lim sup
t→∞
r(xt), (x0, a1, x1, a2, . . .) ∈ P.
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Maitra and Sudderth (1996) call decision problems with this structure non-leavable gambling
problems and provide a characterization of optimal strategies in terms of thrifty and equalizing
strategies. The 1-day maxmin strategies of Theorem 4.3 are the strategies that are thrifty
after each history in Theorem 7.3 of Chapter 4 in Maitra and Sudderth (1996). Thus 1-day
maxmin strategies can be seen as the “subgame” counterpart of thrifty strategies.
A strategy σ is equalizing at a history h ∈ H if and only if for each  > 0
{t ∈ N | r(xt) ≥ v(p|t)− } is infinite, Ph,σ-almost surely.
This follows from the fact that in a decision problem the process of lower values V t is a
Ph,σ-supermartingale, and hence is a convergent sequence Ph,σ-almost surely.
Using Theorem 7.7 of Chapter 4 in Maitra and Sudderth (1996), it follows that σ is
equalizing at h according to their definition. ♦
4.2 The case of an upper semi-continuous payoff function
The remainder of this section is devoted to the case where the payoff function is upper semi-
continuous. We argue that in this case, any strategy of player 1 is equalizing. Because all
upper semi-continuous functions are Borel measurable and because we assumed finite action
sets and a countable state space, the value exists, see Maitra and Sudderth (1998) and Martin
(1998), and the lower value equals the value.
The function u is upper semi-continuous at a play p ∈ P if for every sequence {pt}t∈N of
plays converging to p it holds that
lim sup
t→∞
u(pt) ≤ u(p).
Lemma 4.11. Let the payoff function u be upper semi-continuous at the play p. Then we
have that
u(p) ≥ lim sup
t→∞
v(p|t). (4.4)
Proof. Fix  > 0. For every t ∈ N, define ht = p|t and let pt ∈ P(ht) be such that u(pt) ≥
v(ht) − . Such a play pt exists as player 1 can guarantee a payoff of at least v(ht) −  at
history ht. Since the sequence {pt}t∈N converges to p, we have
u(p) ≥ lim sup
t→∞
u(pt) ≥ lim sup
t→∞
v(ht)− .
Since this holds for every  > 0, the lemma follows.
In view of Lemma 4.11, we obtain the following corollary to Theorems 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7.
Corollary 4.12. Let Γx0(u) be such that u is upper semi-continuous. Then each strategy of
player 1 is equalizing. The strategy σ ∈ S1 is a subgame φ-maxmin strategy if and only if for
every n ∈ N it is an n-day φ-maxmin strategy. The strategy σ ∈ S1 is a subgame maxmin
strategy if and only if it is a 1-day maxmin strategy.
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Example 4.13. (Staying in the set game) Let some subset X ∗ of X be given. For a play
p = (x0, a1, b1, x1, a2, b2 . . . ) we define u(p) to be 1 if xt ∈ X ∗ for every t ∈ N and to be
0 otherwise. Maitra and Sudderth (1996) refer to such a payoff function as “staying in a
set” and in the computer science literature it goes under the name of “safety objective,” see
Bruye`re (2017). Since u is upper semi-continuous, any strategy σ ∈ S1 is equalizing. ♦
Example 4.14. Consider again the centipede game depicted in Figure 2, but with one slight
modification. If the game continues indefinitely, then player 1 receives a payoff of 2 instead of
0. The payoff function is now upper semi-continuous. As argued in Example 4.4, the strategy
σ in which player 1 continues at each history is 1-day maxmin. Because of Corollary 4.12, we
can conclude that the strategy σ is a subgame maxmin strategy. ♦
5 Existence of subgame φ-maxmin strategies
The goal of this section is to give sufficient conditions for the existence of a subgame φ-maxmin
strategy if the tolerance function φ is positive, so for every h ∈ H it holds that φ(h) > 0.
We denote positive tolerance functions by φ > 0. These conditions are formally stated in
Theorem 5.9.
The construction of the subgame φ-maxmin strategy in Theorem 5.9 is as follows. Player
1 starts by playing a (φ(x0)/2)-maxmin strategy. Next, at every history h ∈ H player 1
checks whether the strategy he is currently using is a φ(h)-maxmin strategy for the subgame
at history h. If this is the case he keeps using the strategy. If not, he switches to a (φ(h)/2)-
maxmin strategy for the subgame at history h. We then use Theorem 4.5 to show that this
construction leads to a subgame φ-maxmin strategy. This type of construction is not new,
and similar constructions were used for example in Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille (2001),
Solan and Vieille (2002), and Mashiah-Yaakovi (2015).
Fix a tolerance function φ > 0. For every history h ∈ H, player 1 has a (φ(h)/2)-maxmin
strategy for the subgame at history h, denoted by σh. The function ψ : H → H maps histories
into histories and is such that player 1 is going to use strategy σψ(h) at subgame h ∈ H. The
function ψ is used to describe when player 1 switches strategies and is recursively defined by
setting ψ(x0) = x0 and, for every h ∈ H, for every z ∈ Z,
ψ(hz) =
{
ψ(h), if u(σψ(h), hz) ≥ v(hz)− φ(hz),
hz, otherwise.
The condition u(σψ(h), hz) ≥ v(hz)− φ(hz) verifies whether the strategy to which player
1 switched last, σψ(h), is a φ(hz)-maxmin strategy for the subgame at history hz. If this is
the case, then there is no need to switch and ψ(hz) = ψ(h). Otherwise, player 1 switches
to σhz, which is achieved by setting ψ(hz) = hz. Formally, we define the switching strategy
σφ : H → ∆(A) by
σφ(h) = σψ(h)(h), h ∈ H. (5.1)
The following example illustrates the construction of the switching strategy σφ and shows
that it may not be subgame φ-maxmin.
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Example 5.1. Consider again the centipede game depicted in Figure 2. We recall that, for
every t ∈ N, v(c2t) = v(c2t+1) = (t+ 1)/(t+ 2). Take a tolerance function φ with the property
that, for every t ∈ N, φ(c2t) < 1/((t+ 1)(t+ 2)).
Let h ∈ H be an active history for player 1 or player 2 and let k ∈ N be such that h = c2k
or h = c2k+1. The strategy σh in which player 1 chooses continue at periods 0, 2, . . . , 2k and
chooses quit at every later period, i.e.
σh(c2t) =
{
c, if 2t ≤ 2k,
q, otherwise,
is a maxmin strategy at subgame h.
We now consider the switching strategy σφ. We show by induction that, for every h ∈ H,
for every z ∈ Z, it holds that ψ(hz) = hz if hz is an active history of player 1 and ψ(hz) = h
if hz is an active history of player 2. The statement trivially holds for the initial history. Let
h be an active history of player 2 and let t ∈ N be such that h = c2t+1. Since σh = σc2t is
a maxmin strategy at subgame h, it holds that ψ(c2t+1) = c2t. Let h be an active history of
player 1 and let t ∈ N \ {0} be such that h = c2t. We have that
u(σψ(c
2t−1), c2t) = u(σc
2t−2
, c2t) = tt+1 = v(c
2t)− 1(t+1)(t+2) < v(c2t)− φ(c2t),
so ψ(c2t) = c2t. Since the tolerance function φ is so stringent, it forces player 1 to switch at
each of his active histories. For every t ∈ N, it holds that σφ(c2t) = σc2t(c2t) = c, so under σφ
player 1 chooses c at each of his active histories. The strategy σφ is not a subgame φ-maxmin
strategy as it fails to be φ-equalizing, see Example 4.4. ♦
Given the switching strategy σφ, for every k ∈ N we define the strategy σk : H → ∆(A)
such that it coincides with σφ as long as at most k switches have been made and stops
switching thereafter. Formally, we recursively define the function κ : H → N which counts
the number of switches along a history h by setting κ(x0) = 0 and, for all histories h, hz ∈ H,
κ(hz) =
{
κ(h), if u(σψ(h), hz) ≥ v(hz)− φ(hz),
κ(h) + 1, otherwise.
For every k ∈ N, we define the stopping time Tk : P → N ∪ {∞} by
Tk(p) = inf{t ∈ N|κ(p|t) = k}, p ∈ P. (5.2)
The stopping time Tk indicates the time at which switch k occurred. Since, for t < ∞,
the expression Tk(p) ≤ t only depends on the history up to period t, it holds that the set
{p ∈ P|Tk(p) ≤ t} is F t-measurable and Tk is a stopping time indeed.
We now formally define σk : H → ∆(A). Take any p ∈ P(h) and let
σk(h) =
{
σφ(h), if κ(h) ≤ k,
σh|Tk(p)(h), otherwise.
(5.3)
If κ(h) > k, then the time at which switch k has occurred is the same for every p ∈ P(h), so
it holds that σk is well defined.
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For every k ∈ N, let Rk ⊆ P be the set of plays along which at least k switches occur,
Rk = {p ∈ P|Tk(p) <∞}, (5.4)
so R1 ⊇ R2 ⊇ R3 ⊇ · · · . Furthermore, let R∞ ⊆ P denote the set of plays along which
infinitely many switches occur,
R∞ = ∩∞k=1Rk. (5.5)
The next result is very intuitive. Consider the strategies σk, σk+1, . . . . All these strategies
agree with σφ for as long as σφ does not require more than k switches. Consequently, the
measures that these strategies induce on P assign the same probability to any event that is
“determined” before switch k + 1 occurs, i.e. to any event in the sigma-algebra FTk+1 .
Lemma 5.2. Let a strategy τ ∈ S2, a history h ∈ H, and some k ∈ N be given. For
σ = σk, σk+1, . . . , σφ, the probability measures Ph,σ,τ all coincide on the sigma-algebra FTk+1.
Furthermore, these probability measures all agree on each universally measurable subset of
P \ Rk+1.
Proof. A set A of the universally measurable sigma-algebra F is called agreeable if for σ =
σk, σk+1, . . . , σφ the measures Ph,σ,τ all assign the same probability to A.
We argue first that each cylinder set in FTk+1 is agreeable. A cylinder set P(h) is a
member of FTk+1 if and only if κ(h) ≤ k + 1. Let a cylinder set P(h′) in FTk+1 be given.
Since κ(h′) ≤ k+ 1, we know that κ(h′′) ≤ k for each history h′′ preceding h′. It follows that
σk(h′′) = σk+1(h′′) = · · · = σφ(h′′). Since this applies to each history h′′ that precedes h′, the
set P(h′) is agreeable.
Now take any E ∈ FTk+1 . For t ∈ N, let Et = E ∩ {p ∈ P | Tk+1(p) = t} and let
E∞ = E ∩ {p ∈ P | Tk+1(p) =∞}. To show that E is agreeable, it suffices to show that the
sets Et and E∞ are.
Let some t ∈ N be given. We know that Et is a member of F t. Consequently, Et can be
written as a disjoint union of cylinder sets in F t, say Et = ∪{Cn | n ∈ N}, with each Cn a
member of F t. Since each Cn is a subset of the set {p ∈ P | Tk+1(p) = t}, it is a member of
FTk+1 , so is agreeable by the result of the second paragraph in the proof. It now follows that
Et is agreeable.
To show that E∞ is agreeable, we make use of the fact that E∞ is a Borel set and of the
regularity of σ on the Borel sigma-algebra. Let O be any open subset of P containing E∞.
The set O can be written as a disjoint union of cylinder sets, say O = ∪{P(hn) | n ∈ N}.
Without loss of generality it holds that, for every n ∈ N the set P(hn) has a point in common
with E∞. Thus in particular there is p ∈ P(hn) with Tk+1(p) = ∞. This implies that
κ(hn) ≤ k and hence that P(hn) is a member of FTk+1 . We conclude that each P(hn) is
agreeable by the result of the second paragraph in the proof. It follows that O is an agreeable
set.
To prove the second claim, we notice that all Borel subsets of P \ Rk+1 = {p ∈ P |
Tk+1(p) =∞} are members of FTk+1 , so are agreeable. The result for universally measurable
subsets of {p ∈ P | Tk+1(p) = ∞} follows since each such set differs from a Borel set by a
negligible set.
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The following lemma is a special case of the optional sampling theorem with unbounded
stopping times as presented in Yeh (1995, p. 139). Assume we have specified an F∞-
measurable stochastic variable U∞σ . Let T be a stopping time. We define the stochastic
variable UTσ by letting it agree with U
t
σ on the set {p ∈ P : T (p) = t} for each t ∈ N and by
letting it agree with U∞σ on the set {p ∈ P : T (p) =∞}. The stochastic variable UTσ is then
FT -measurable (Yeh, 1995, Theorem 3.28).
Exactly how the stochastic variable U∞σ must be chosen is a rather subtle matter. In
Lemmas 5.3, 5.5, and 5.6, U∞σ is taken equal to some Borel measurable function that agrees
with u almost surely for the measure that is specified by the respective lemma. We cannot
use u itself, since u is only assumed to be universally measurable. Neither can we fix U∞σ in
advance, because there is no function that would agree with u almost surely with respect to
all the measures that arise henceforth.
Lemma 5.3. (Optional sampling for guarantee level) Let a strategy profile (σ, τ) ∈ S1 × S2,
t ∈ N, and a history h ∈ Ht of length t be given. Let U∞σ be an F∞-measurable stochastic
variable that Ph,σ,τ -almost surely coincides with u. Consider the stopping times S and T such
that, for each p ∈ P(h), t ≤ S(p) ≤ T (p). Then
UTσ ≤ Eh,σ,τ [u|FT ], Ph,σ,τ -almost surely, (5.6)
USσ ≤ Eh,σ,τ [UTσ |FS ], Ph,σ,τ -almost surely. (5.7)
Proof. The result follows by Theorem 8.16 in Yeh (1995, p. 139), applied to the process
(Unσ)n≥t on the measurable space (P,F ,Ph,σ,τ ) with a filtration (Fn)n≥t.
We verify that the conditions of Theorem 8.16 in Yeh (1995) are satisfied. The process
(Unσ)n≥t is a Ph,σ,τ -submartingale with respect to the filtration (Fn)n≥t by Lemma 3.3. Take ξ
of Theorem 8.16 in Yeh (1995) equal to u. Since U∞σ is an F∞-measurable stochastic variable
that Ph,σ,τ -almost surely coincides with u, it is a version of Eh,σ,τ [u|F∞], as is required by
the theorem.
Lastly, we verify that condition (1) of Theorem 8.16 in Yeh (1995) is satisfied. Notice that,
for every n ≥ t, for every play p ∈ P, we have Unσ(p) = u(σ, p|n) ≤ Ep|n,σ,τ [u]. The right-hand
side of this inequality is a version of Eh,σ,τ [u|Fn]. Consequently, Unσ ≤ Eh,σ,τ [u|Fn] holds
Ph,σ,τ -almost surely, as desired.
The next lemma relates the guaranteed expected payoffs of strategies σk and σk+1 at the
moment of switch k + 1. For this result, we choose U∞σk = U
∞
σk+1 to be any F∞-measurable
stochastic variable. How this stochastic variable is related to u is unimportant. We write Φt
to denote the F t-measurable stochastic variable given by Φt(p) = φ(p|t).
Lemma 5.4. Let k ∈ N and F∞-measurable stochastic variables U∞σk , U∞σk+1 such that U∞σk =
U∞σk+1 be given. Then it holds that
U
Tk+1
σk
≤ UTk+1
σk+1
− 12ΦTk+1 · I(Tk+1 <∞). (5.8)
Proof. Let some p ∈ P be given. We distinguish the following two cases.
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Case 1: Tk+1(p) < ∞. In this case at least k + 1 switches occur along the play p. For
h = p|Tk+1(p) we have the following inequalities
u(σk, h) < v(h)− φ(h) = v(h)− 12φ(h)− 12φ(h) ≤ u(σk+1, h)− 12φ(h),
where the first inequality holds since σk is not a φ(h)-maxmin strategy for the subgame at
history h and the second inequality holds because the strategy σk+1 is a (φ(h)/2)-maxmin
strategy for the subgame at history h. Since I(Tk+1(p) <∞) = 1, (5.8) holds.
Case 2: Tk+1(p) =∞. In this case we have
U
Tk+1
σk
(p) = U∞σk(p) = U
∞
σk+1(p) = U
Tk+1
σk+1
(p).
Thus (5.8) holds as an equality.
The following lemma states the intuitive property that for histories with less than k + 1
switches or histories at which switch k + 1 occurs, the strategy σk+1 guarantees at least the
same payoff to player 1 than strategy σk.
Lemma 5.5. Let t ∈ N and a history h ∈ Ht of length t be given. Let k ∈ N be such that
Tk+1(p) ≥ t for every p ∈ P(h). Then it holds that u(σk, h) ≤ u(σk+1, h).
Proof. Fix strategy τ ∈ S2 of player 2.
We first define U∞σk . Consider the probability measure Q on the measurable space (P,F)
given by Q(A) =
∑
k∈N 2
−k−1Ph,σk,τ (A) for each A ∈ F . Let u¯ be an F∞-measurable
stochastic variable with the property that u¯ = u, Q-almost surely. Since Ph,σk,τ is absolutely
continuous with respect to Q it holds that u¯ = u, Ph,σk,τ -almost surely, for every k ∈ N. We
define U∞σk to be equal to u¯, for every k ∈ N.
We now obtain the following inequalities. First, we have
u(σk, h) ≤ Eh,σk,τ [UTk+1σk ]
an as instance of inequality (5.7) of Lemma 5.3 with S = t and T = Tk+1. Secondly, from the
fact that U
Tk+1
σk
is an FTk+1-measurable stochastic variable, we obtain by Lemma 5.2 that
Eh,σk,τ [U
Tk+1
σk
] = Eh,σk+1,τ [U
Tk+1
σk
].
Thirdly, we know that
U
Tk+1
σk
≤ UTk+1
σk+1
≤ Eh,σk+1,τ [u|FTk+1 ], Ph,σk+1,τ -almost surely,
where the first of these inequalities follows from Lemma 5.4 and the second one follows by
inequality (5.6) of Lemma 5.3. Taking the expectation of the last array of inequalities with
respect to Ph,σk+1,τ and making use of the law of iterated expectation yields
Eh,σk+1,τ [U
Tk+1
σk
] ≤ Eh,σk+1,τ [u].
Combining these facts yields u(σk, h) ≤ Eh,σk+1,τ [u]. Taking the infimum over all strategies
τ of player 2 completes the proof.
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Notice that a switch occurring at history h increases the guarantee level of player 1 at h
by at least φ(h)/2. Although it is possible that player 1 switches infinitely many times along
a play p, and therefore incurs infinitely many increases in his guarantee level along this play,
the total overall increase in his guarantee level is bounded, since the payoff function itself is
a bounded function. The next lemma provides the formal statement. We define
M = sup
p∈P
|u(p)|.
Lemma 5.6. Let t ∈ N, a history h ∈ Ht of length t, and a strategy τ ∈ S2 of player 2 be
given. Then
∞∑
k=κ(h)+1
Eh,σφ,τ
[
1
2Φ
Tk · I (Tk <∞)
] ≤ 2M. (5.9)
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 5.5, let u¯ be any F∞-measurable stochastic variable with
the property that, for every k ∈ N, u¯ = u, Ph,σk,τ -almost surely. For every k ∈ N we define
U∞σk = u¯.
Let some k > κ(h) be given. For every p ∈ P(h), it holds that t ≤ Tk(p) ≤ Tk+1(p), so
Lemma 5.3 implies
UTk
σk
≤ Eh,σk,τ [UTk+1σk |FTk ], Ph,σk,τ -almost surely. (5.10)
We now have
Eh,σφ,τ [U
Tk
σk
] = Eh,σk,τ [U
Tk
σk
] ≤ Eh,σk,τ [UTk+1σk ] = Eh,σφ,τ [U
Tk+1
σk
],
where the two equalities follow from Lemma 5.2 and the fact that both UTk
σk
and U
Tk+1
σk
are
FTk+1-measurable stochastic variables, and the inequality follows by taking the expectation
on both sides of inequality (5.10) and the law of iterated expectation.
Using Lemma 5.4 we can conclude that
Eh,σφ,τ
[
1
2Φ
Tk+1 · I(Tk+1 <∞)
] ≤ Eh,σφ,τ [UTk+1σk+1]− Eh,σφ,τ [UTk+1σk ]
≤ Eh,σφ,τ
[
U
Tk+1
σk+1
]
− Eh,σφ,τ
[
UTk
σk
]
.
Summing the preceding inequality over k = κ(h) + 1, . . . ,K, we obtain
K∑
k=κ(h)+1
Eh,σφ,τ
[
1
2Φ
Tk · I(Tk <∞)
] ≤ Eh,σφ,τ [UTKσK]− Eh,σφ,τ [UTκ(h)+1σκ(h)+1] ≤ 2M.
The result follows by taking the limit as K →∞.
The following lemma plays a crucial role in the proof of Theorem 5.9. Essentially it says
that along almost any play p ∈ P only finitely many switches occur or the tolerance level
goes to zero.
Lemma 5.7. For every history h ∈ H, for every strategy τ ∈ S2 of player 2, it holds that
lim
k→∞
ΦTk · I(Tk <∞) = 0, Ph,σφ,τ -almost surely.
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Proof. Let us write Xk = Φ
Tk · I(Tk < ∞) and k′ = κ(h) + 1. Since Xk ≥ 0, the monotone
convergence theorem implies that Eh,σφ,τ [
∑∞
k=k′ Xk] =
∑∞
k=k′ Eh,σφ,τ [Xk]. The latter expres-
sion is finite by Lemma 5.6. Thus
∑∞
k=k′ Xk has a finite mean with respect to the probability
measure Ph,σφ,τ . Hence
∑∞
k=k′ Xk <∞ holds Ph,σφ,τ -almost surely. This implies that Xk → 0
holds Ph,σφ,τ -almost surely.
The following result is of interest in its own right. It states that the switching strategy
σφ is n-day φ-maxmin for every n ∈ N.
Theorem 5.8. Let a game Γx0(u) and a tolerance function φ > 0 be given. For every n ∈ N,
the switching strategy σφ is n-day φ-maxmin.
Proof. Let a history h ∈ H with length t be given. Let k = κ(h) denote the number of
switches that has occurred along the history h. We obtain the following chain of inequalities
v(h)−φ(h) ≤ u(σk, h) ≤ u(σt+n, h) ≤ Eh,σt+n,τ [U t+nσt+n ] ≤ Eh,σt+n,τ [V t+n] = Eh,σφ,τ [V t+n],
where the first inequality holds since σk is a φ(h)-maxmin strategy for the subgame at history
h, the second inequality holds by Lemma 5.5 since k ≤ t ≤ t+n, the third inequality holds by
Lemma 3.3, and the fourth one follows since U t+n
σt+n
≤ V t+n. The final equality follows from
the fact that the stochastic variable V t+n is F t+n-measurable and the fact that the strategy
σt+n coincides with σφ at least until time t+ n.
We are now in a position to state the main result of this section, which gives sufficient
conditions for the existence of subgame φ-maxmin strategies.
Theorem 5.9. Let a game Γx0(u) and a tolerance function φ > 0 be given such that for every
p ∈ P at least one of the following two conditions holds:
1. (point of upper semicontinuity) The function u is upper semi-continuous at p.
2. (positive limit inferior) lim inft→∞ φ(p|t) > 0.
Then there exists a subgame φ-maxmin strategy in the game Γx0(u).
Proof. We define the tolerance function φ′ by
φ′(h) = 12 min{φ(h′)|h′  h}, h ∈ H.
Thus φ′ is a non-increasing tolerance function with φ′ ≤ 12φ.
We show that σφ
′
is φ′-equalizing. Since 2φ′ ≤ φ and σφ′ is an n-day φ′-maxmin strategy
for every n ∈ N by Theorem 5.8, it then follows from Theorem 4.5 that σφ′ is a subgame
φ-maxmin strategy.
Let U denote the set of plays p ∈ P at which u is upper semi-continuous and let I denote
the set of plays p ∈ P such that lim inft→∞ φ(p|t) > 0. By the assumption of the theorem it
holds that P = U ∪ I. By the definition of φ′, we have lim inft→∞ φ′(p|t) > 0 for each p ∈ I.
Let some t ∈ N, a history h ∈ Ht, and a strategy τ ∈ S2 be given.
Step 1: For every p ∈ U , u(p) ≥ lim supn→∞ V n(p)− φ′.
This follows directly from Lemma 4.11.
22
For every k ∈ N, we define Jk = {p ∈ I ∩ (Rk \ Rk+1) | limn→∞ Unσk,τ (p) = u(p)} and
J = ⋃k∈N Jk.
Step 2: For every p ∈ J , u(p) ≥ lim supn→∞ V n(p)− φ′.
Let k ∈ N and p ∈ Jk be given. Exactly k switches occur along the play p and the
last switch occurs at time Tk(p). By our construction of σ
φ′ , this means that for each time
n > Tk(p) the strategy σ
k is a φ′(p|n)-maxmin strategy for the subgame at history p|n,
so u(σk, p|n) ≥ v(p|n) − φ′(p|n). Since Unσk,τ (p) ≥ u(σk, p|n) and since for n ≥ t we have
φ′(p|n) ≤ φ′(h), we conclude that for n ≥ t
Unσk,τ (p) ≥ V n(p)− φ′(h).
Taking the limit as n goes to infinity, and making use of the fact that p ∈ Jk, we obtain
u(p) = lim
n→∞U
n
σk,τ (p) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
V n(p)− φ′(h).
Step 3: Ph,σφ′ ,τ (I ∩ R∞) = 0.
Recall that by Lemma 5.7, ΦTk · I(Tk < ∞) converges to 0 as k goes to infinity, Ph,σφ′ ,τ -
almost surely. Also recall that R∞ is the set of plays where infinitely many switches occur.
Thus I(Tk < ∞) is identically equal to 1 on R∞. Furthermore, lim infk→∞ΦTk > 0 every-
where on I. We conclude that ΦTk · I(Tk <∞) does not converge to zero on I ∩R∞ and the
result follows.
Step 4: Ph,σφ′ ,τ (U ∪ J ) = 1.
For every k ∈ N, it holds by Levy’s zero-one law (Lemma A.2 in Appendix A) that
Ph,σk,τ (Jk) = Ph,σk,τ (I ∩ (Rk \ Rk+1)).
Using Lemma 5.2 twice yields
Ph,σφ′ ,τ (Jk) = Ph,σk,τ (Jk) = Ph,σk,τ (I ∩ (Rk \ Rk+1)) = Ph,σφ′ ,τ (I ∩ (Rk \ Rk+1)).
We now have
Ph,σφ′ ,τ (J ) = Ph,σφ′ ,τ (I \ R∞) = Ph,σφ′ ,τ (I),
where the last equality follows from Step 3. Finally, we obtain
Ph,σφ′ ,τ (U ∪ J ) ≥ Ph,σφ′ ,τ (U \ I) + Ph,σφ′ ,τ (J ) = Ph,σφ′ ,τ (U \ I) + Ph,σφ′ ,τ (I) = 1,
where the last equality follows from the fact that the sets U and I cover P(h).
Theorem 5.9 generalizes Proposition 11 in Mashiah-Yaakovi (2015), where the existence of
a subgame -optimal strategy in a two-player zero-sum stochastic game with Borel measurable
payoff functions is shown. The tolerance function φ there is given by φ(h) =  for every h ∈ H,
so for every play the tolerance function has a positive limit inferior. Theorem 5.9 yields the
existence of a subgame -maxmin strategy. Because the Borel measurability of the payoff
function guarantees the existence of the value (Maitra and Sudderth, 1998, and Martin,
1998), this is equivalent to proving the existence of a subgame -optimal strategy.
In Section 6, we argue that Theorem 5.9 also provides further insight into the main result
of Laraki, Maitra, and Sudderth (2013). There the authors prove among other things that if
the payoff function is bounded and upper semi-continuous, then the first player has a subgame
optimal strategy.
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6 Subgame maxmin strategies
The goal of this section is to explore the relationship between the concept of a subgame
maxmin strategy and that of a subgame φ-maxmin strategy for φ > 0. The main result of
this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. For every game Γx0(u) there exists a tolerance function φ
∗ > 0 such that the
following statements are equivalent:
1. The game Γx0(u) has a subgame maxmin strategy.
2. The game Γx0(u) has a subgame φ
∗-maxmin strategy.
Because every subgame maxmin strategy is a subgame φ-maxmin strategy, statement 1
clearly implies statement 2. To prove the converse, we construct a tolerance function φ∗ > 0
such that the tolerance levels decrease rapidly along each play. Then, provided that player
1 has a subgame φ∗-maxmin strategy, we use Corollary 4.7 from Section 4 to construct a
subgame maxmin strategy.
Theorem 6.1 has the following corollary.
Corollary 6.2. The following statements are equivalent:
1. The game Γx0(u) has a subgame maxmin strategy.
2. For every φ > 0, the game Γx0(u) has a subgame φ-maxmin strategy.
We would like to make two remarks. First, as the payoff function u need not be continuous,
one cannot simply use a continuity argument to prove that statement 2 of Corollary 6.2 implies
statement 1. Second, note that the existence of a subgame -maxmin strategy for every  > 0
is a weaker requirement than statements 1 and 2 of Corollary 6.2. Indeed, as Example 3.2
already illustrated, there exist games which admit a subgame -maxmin strategy for every
 > 0 but do not admit a subgame maxmin strategy.
The special case where the payoff-function is upper semi-continuous deserves some addi-
tional attention. From Maitra and Sudderth (1998) and Martin (1998) it follows that every
two-player zero-sum stochastic game with a countable state space, finite action sets, and a
Borel measurable payoff function admits a value. Because every upper semi-continuous payoff
function is Borel measurable, the existence of the value in our model is guaranteed. From
Theorem 5.9 we obtain the existence of a subgame φ-optimal strategy for every φ > 0. Com-
bining this with Corollary 6.2 shows that player 1 has a subgame optimal strategy. Hereby we
obtain a special case of the result by Laraki, Maitra, and Sudderth (2013), where the authors
allow the state space to be a Borel subset of a Polish space and transition probabilities to be
determined by a Borel transition function.
When we are interested in pure strategies that guarantee the maxmin levels, we can
strengthen the result of Theorem 6.1. In the context of simultaneous move games, pure
strategies are of course rather restrictive. Still, there are important classes of games, such as
perfect information games, in which they are natural and play a prominent role.
Theorem 6.3. For every game Γx0(u) there exists a tolerance function φ
∗ > 0 such that the
following statements are equivalent:
24
1. The pure strategy σ ∈ S1 is a subgame maxmin strategy.
2. The pure strategy σ ∈ S1 is a subgame φ∗-maxmin strategy.
This section is structured as follows. We start by proving Theorem 6.3, which is easier
and helps us explain the main ideas. Then we turn to the proof of Theorem 6.1.
6.1 The proof of Theorem 6.3
In this subsection we prove Theorem 6.3. Since the statement of this theorem is about pure
strategies, the proof is less technical and the intuition is more transparent.
We only need to prove that there is φ∗ > 0 such that statement 2 of Theorem 6.3 implies
statement 1 of Theorem 6.3. From now on, for any t ∈ N, history h ∈ Ht with some final
state x, and mixed actions m1 ∈ ∆(A) and m2 ∈ ∆(B), we denote the expectation of the
lower value at the next stage by
Eh,m1,m2
[
V t+1
]
=
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈B
∑
x′∈X
q(x′|h, a, b) · v(h, a, b, x′). (6.1)
The proof consists of two steps.
Step 1. Construction of φ∗ > 0.
For every t ∈ N, for every history h ∈ Ht, there exists a number d(h) > 0 such that for
every action a ∈ A of player 1 either one of the following holds:
 Action a guarantees that the lower value does not drop in expectation: for every m2 ∈
∆(B), Eh,a,m2
[
V t+1
] ≥ v(h).
 There exists a mixed action m2 ∈ ∆(B) for player 2 such that, if player 1 uses action a,
the lower value drops in expectation by more than d(h): Eh,a,m2
[
V t+1
]
< v(h)− d(h).
This statement is true because the action set A of player 1 is finite. We define φ∗ > 0 as
follows. For every t ∈ N, for every history h ∈ Ht, let φ∗(h) = min{d(h), 2−t}. The term 2−t
is included so that the tolerance levels tend to 0 along each play. For every p ∈ P, it holds
that lim
t→∞φ
∗(p|t) = 0.
Step 2. If the pure strategy σ ∈ S1 is a subgame φ∗-maxmin strategy, then σ is a subgame
maxmin strategy.
Let the pure strategy σ ∈ S1 be subgame φ∗-maxmin. We verify that σ satisfies the
conditions of Corollary 4.7.
First we show that σ is 1-day maxmin. Fix t ∈ N and h ∈ Ht. Let a = σ(h) denote the
action that σ recommends at h. Then, for every mixed action m2 ∈ ∆(B) and strategy τ ∈ S2
with m2 = τ(h), we have
Eh,a,m2
[
V t+1
]
= Eh,σ,τ
[
V t+1
] ≥ v(h)− φ∗(h) ≥ v(h)− d(h),
where the first inequality follows from the fact that σ is subgame φ∗-maxmin and by con-
dition 1 of Theorem 4.6, and the second inequality follows from the definition of φ∗(h).
Therefore, by the choice of d(h) in Step 1, for every m2 ∈ ∆(B) it holds that
Eh,a,m2
[
V t+1
] ≥ v(h).
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Hence, for every strategy τ ∈ S2 it holds that
Eh,σ,τ
[
V t+1
]
= Eh,a,τ(h)
[
V t+1
] ≥ v(h).
Thus, σ is 1-day maxmin.
We show that σ is equalizing. Take some τ ∈ S2. Because σ is subgame φ∗-maxmin, for
every p ∈ P(h), for every n ≥ t, we have
Unσ,τ (p) = Ep|n,σ,τ [u] ≥ v(p|n)− φ∗(p|n) = V n(p)− Φ∗n(p),
where Φ∗n(p) = φ∗(p|n). We conclude that
lim
n→∞U
n
σ,τ ≥ lim sup
n→∞
(V n − Φ∗n) = lim sup
n→∞
V n − lim
n→∞Φ
∗n = lim sup
n→∞
V n,
where the last equality from the fact that for all p ∈ P we have lim
n→∞φ
∗(p|n) = 0, so
u = lim
n→∞U
n
σ,τ ≥ lim sup
n→∞
V n, Ph,σ,τ -almost surely,
where the equality follows from Lemma A.2 in Appendix A. We have shown that σ is equal-
izing.
6.2 The one-shot game Υh
To prove Theorem 6.1, we first analyze a one-shot zero-sum game in this subsection. For
each history, the one-shot game is such that the payoff is given by the lower value at the
next stage. In the next subsection, we use these one-shot games to construct the tolerance
function φ∗ > 0.
For some t ∈ N, let h ∈ Ht be a history in the game Γx0(u). The one-shot zero-sum game
Υh is played as follows. Player 1 chooses an action a ∈ A and player 2 simultaneously chooses
an action b ∈ B. Then, player 1 receives from player 2 the amount Eh,a,b
[
V t+1
]
. As the action
sets A and B are finite, the game Υh has a value, which we denote by w(h). Furthermore,
both players have optimal mixed actions in the game Υh.
The following lemma states that the value w(h) of the one-shot game Υh equals the lower
value v(h) at the history h in the original game Γx0(u).
Lemma 6.4. For every history h ∈ H, we have w(h) = v(h).
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Fix t ∈ N and a history h ∈ Ht. Now suppose that
w(h) 6= v(h). Then we have either w(h) > v(h) or w(h) < v(h).
Case 1: w(h) > v(h).
Let δ = w(h) − v(h). We derive a contradiction by showing that, in the subgame of Γx0(u)
at history h, player 1 can guarantee an expected payoff of at least v(h) + δ/2.
Let m1 ∈ ∆(A) be an optimal mixed action for player 1 in the one-shot game Υh. Let
σ ∈ S1 be such that σ(h) = m1 and such that it induces a (δ/2)-maxmin strategy for the
subgame at each history in period t+ 1, i.e., for every h′ ∈ Ht+1, for every τ ∈ S2,
Eh′,σ,τ [u] ≥ v(h′)− δ2 . (6.2)
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Then, for every τ ∈ S2, it holds that
Eh,σ,τ [u] = Eh,σ,τ
[
U tσ,τ
]
= Eh,σ,τ
[
U t+1σ,τ
]
≥ Eh,σ,τ
[
V t+1
]− δ2 = Eh,m1,τ(h) [V t+1]− δ2 ≥ w(h)− δ2 = v(h) + δ2 ,
where the second equality follows from the fact that (Unσ,τ )n≥t is a Ph,σ,τ -martingale, the first
inequality follows from (6.2), and the second inequality follows from the choice of m1.
Case 2: w(h) < v(h).1
Let δ = v(h)−w(h). We derive a contradiction by showing that, for every strategy of player
1, there is a strategy for player 2 such that the expected payoff is at most v(h)− δ/2 in the
subgame of Γx0(u) at history h.
Fix σ ∈ S1 and let m1 = σ(h). Let m2 ∈ ∆(B) be an optimal mixed action for player 2
in the one-shot game Υh. Let τ ∈ S2 be such that τ(h) = m2 and the expected payoff under
(σ, τ) in the subgame at each history h′ at period t+ 1 is at most the lower value v(h′) + δ/2,
i.e., for every h′ ∈ Ht+1,
Eh′,σ,τ [u] ≤ v(h′) + δ2 . (6.3)
We have that
v(h)− δ2 = w(h) + δ2 ≥ Eh,m1,m2
[
V t+1
]
+ δ2
≥ Eh,m1,m2
[
U t+1σ,τ
]
= Eh,σ,τ
[
U t+1σ,τ
]
= Eh,σ,τ
[
U tσ,τ
]
= Eh,σ,τ [u] ,
where the first inequality follows from the choice of m2, the second inequality follows from
(6.3), and the penultimate equality follows from the fact that (Unσ,τ )n≥t is a Ph,σ,τ -martingale.
Because σ is chosen arbitrarily, we have derived a contradiction with the definition of the
lower value v(h).
The total variation distance between two mixed actions m1, n1 ∈ ∆(A) of player 1 is
defined as
‖m1 − n1‖TV =
∑
a∈A
|m1(a)− n1(a)|.
The total variation distance between two probability measures P and P′ on (P,F) is defined
as
‖P−P′‖TV = sup{
n∑
i=1
|P(Fi)−P′(Fi)| : F1, . . . , Fn ∈ F and {F1, . . . , Fn} is a partition of P}.
Let t ∈ N and a history h ∈ Ht be given. Let Oh ⊆ ∆(A) denote the set of optimal mixed
actions of player 1 in the one-shot game Υh. By Lemma 6.4 it holds that
Oh =
{
m1 ∈ ∆(A) | for every m2 ∈ ∆(B), Eh,m1,m2
[
V t+1
] ≥ v(h)} .
Note that Oh is a compact subset of ∆(A). For every m1 ∈ ∆(A), the distance of m1 to Oh
is defined by
‖m1 −Oh‖TV = min
n1∈Oh
‖m1 − n1‖TV.
1The proof of this case in not symmetric to the proof of Case 1, because we consider the lower value. Imitating
the proof of Case 1 for player 2 would yield results in terms of the upper value.
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Due to the compactness of Oh, the minimum is attained. For δ > 0, let D
δ
h be the set of
mixed actions of player 1 which have a distance of at least δ to the set Oh, so
Dδh = {m1 ∈ ∆(A) | ‖m1 −Oh‖TV ≥ δ} . (6.4)
The mixed actions in Dδh are not optimal in the one-shot game Υh. The following lemma says
that the loss in utility caused by these mixed actions has a positive lower bound.
Lemma 6.5. Let h ∈ H and δ > 0 be given. If Dδh is non-empty, then there is  > 0 such
that for every m1 ∈ Dδh there exists b ∈ B such that
Eh,m1,b
[
V t+1
] ≤ v(h)− .
Proof. Assume Dδh is non-empty. Consider the function e
δ
h : D
δ
h → R defined by
eδh(m1) = v(h)−min
b∈B
Eh,m1,b
[
V t+1
]
, m1 ∈ Dδh. (6.5)
Since B is finite, the minimum exists. For every m1 ∈ Dδh, we have m1 /∈ Oh and therefore
there exists m2 ∈ ∆(B) such that Eh,m1,m2
[
V t+1
]
< v(h). The function eδh is therefore a
positive and continuous function on a compact set, so has a positive minimum.
6.3 Construction of the tolerance function φ∗
In this subsection, we define a positive tolerance function φ∗. Fix a positive and decreasing
sequence (δt)t∈N such that
∑∞
t=0 δt <∞. Notice that this implies limt→∞ δt = 0.
For every t ∈ N, for every history h ∈ Ht, we define the constant c(h) as follows. If the
set Dδth is non-empty, then c(h) is equal to the positive number  of Lemma 6.5 and c(h) = δt
otherwise. We define
φ∗(h) = min{c(h),δt}2 . (6.6)
Notice that 0 < φ∗(h) < δt.
We summarize the properties of the tolerance function φ∗:
1. For every history h ∈ H, we have φ∗(h) > 0.
2. For every play p ∈ P, we have ∑∞t=0 φ∗(p|t) ≤∑∞t=0 δt <∞.
3. For every play p ∈ P, lim
t→∞φ
∗(p|t) = 0.
4. If the set Dδth is non-empty, then by the choice of c(h), for every m1 ∈ Dδth there exists
b ∈ B such that
Eh,m1,b
[
V t+1
] ≤ v(h)− c(h) < v(h)− φ∗(h).
The importance of
∑∞
t=0 δt < ∞ is underlined by the following lemma. Recall that
M = supp∈P |u(p)|.
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Lemma 6.6. Let the strategies σ, σ′ ∈ S1 be such that, for every t ∈ N, for every history
h ∈ Ht, ‖σ(h) − σ′(h)‖TV ≤ δt. Then, for every strategy τ ∈ S2, for every t ∈ N, and for
every history h ∈ Ht,
∣∣Eh,σ,τ [u]− Eh,σ′,τ [u]∣∣ ≤M · ∞∑
n=t
δn.
Proof. Let τ ∈ S2 be given. It follows from a more general result in Abate, Redig, and
Tkachev (2014, theorem 1) that, for every t ∈ N, for every history h ∈ Ht,
‖Ph,σ,τ − Ph,σ′,τ‖TV ≤
∞∑
n=t
δn. (6.7)
For completeness, we provide a direct proof of this inequality in Lemma B.3 in Appendix B.
The claim of Lemma 6.6 follows directly.
Lemma 6.6 says the following. Consider two arbitrary strategies σ, σ′ ∈ S1 such that the
total variation distance between the mixed actions at every history in period t is at most δt.
Now consider t ∈ N, a history h ∈ Ht, and a strategy τ ∈ S2 of player 2. Then the expected
payoffs under (σ, τ) and (σ′, τ) in the subgame at h differ at most the constant M times∑∞
n=t δn. Note that this bound does not depend on the strategy τ and it only depends on
the history h through its period t. Moreover, these bounds tend to 0 as t goes to infinity.
The importance of property 4 of the tolerance function is shown by the following lemma.
It says that if σ ∈ S1 is a subgame φ∗-maxmin strategy, then for every h ∈ H the mixed
action σ(h) is close to the set of optimal mixed actions Oh in the one-shot game Υh.
Lemma 6.7. Let σ ∈ S1 be a subgame φ∗-maxmin strategy. Then, for every t ∈ N, for every
history h ∈ Ht, we have σ(h) /∈ Dδth , so ‖σ(h)−Oh‖TV < δt.
Proof. Because σ is a subgame φ∗-maxmin strategy, it follows from condition 1 of Theorem
4.6 that for every mixed action m2 ∈ ∆(B) of player 2
Eh,σ(h),m2
[
V t+1
] ≥ v(h)− φ∗(h).
If Dδth is empty, then there is nothing to prove. If D
δt
h is non-empty, then property 4 of φ
∗
shows that σ(h) /∈ Dδth .
6.4 The proof of Theorem 6.1
Proof. Let Γx0(u) be a game and take the tolerance function φ
∗ as defined in Subsection 6.3.
We only need to show that statement 2 implies statement 1. Let σ ∈ S1 be a subgame
φ∗-maxmin strategy of Γx0(u).
With the help of σ, we define a strategy σ∗ ∈ S1 in Step 1 of the proof. Then it is shown
that σ∗ is a subgame maxmin strategy of Γx0(u) in Steps 2 and 3 of the proof by verifying
that σ∗ satisfies the conditions of Corollary 4.7.
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Step 1: Definition of σ∗ ∈ S1.
Take t ∈ N and a history h ∈ Ht. In view of Lemma 6.7, it holds that ‖σ(h) − Oh‖TV < δt.
Therefore, there exists m∗(h) ∈ Oh such that
‖σ(h)−m∗(h)‖TV < δt. (6.8)
Now define σ∗(h) = m∗(h).
Step 2: σ∗ is 1-day maxmin.
Consider some τ ∈ S2. For every t ∈ N, for every h ∈ Ht, since σ∗(h) ∈ Oh we have that
Eh,σ∗,τ
[
V t+1
] ≥ v(h).
Step 3: σ∗ is equalizing.
Consider some τ ∈ S2. In view of (6.8) we can apply Lemma 6.6 to conclude that, for every
t ∈ N, for every h ∈ Ht,
|Eh,σ,τ [u]− Eh,σ∗,τ [u]| ≤M ·
∞∑
n=t
δn.
Hence, for every t ∈ N, for every history h ∈ Ht, and for every n ≥ t,
∣∣Unσ,τ [u]− Unσ∗,τ [u]∣∣ ≤M · ∞∑
i=n
δi, Ph,σ∗,τ -almost surely. (6.9)
Because σ is subgame φ∗-maxmin, for every history h ∈ H, we have
Eh,σ,τ [u] ≥ v(h)− φ∗(h). (6.10)
Thus, for every history h ∈ H it holds that
u = lim
t→∞U
t
σ∗,τ = lim
t→∞U
t
σ,τ ≥ lim sup
t→∞
(
V t − Φ∗t) = lim sup
t→∞
V t, Ph,σ∗,τ -almost surely,
where the first equality is due to Lemma A.2 in Appendix A, the second equality follows from
(6.9), the inequality is by (6.10), and the last equality is a consequence of property 3 of φ∗
from Subsection 6.3.
7 Discussion
In the previous sections we have assumed that action sets are finite and the state space is
countable. The goal of this section is to analyze these assumptions further and to pinpoint
where and how they were used.
Throughout this paper the restrictions on the cardinalities of action sets and state space
were used to ensure the following properties:
1. The measurability of the lower value.
2. The existence of 1-day optimal actions in the game Υh.
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The measurability of the lower value is crucial for the sufficient (Theorem 4.5) and neces-
sary (Theorem 4.6) conditions of subgame φ-maxmin strategies as well as for the characteri-
zation result (Corollary 4.7) for subgame maxmin strategies. Because the results in Sections
5 and 6 rely on this sufficient condition, the measurability of the lower value is indispensable
throughout the paper. When working with infinite action sets and uncountable state spaces,
Nowak (1985) and the references therein demonstrate that the (lower) value is not necessarily
measurable.
Apart from ensuring that the lower value is measurable, the finiteness of action sets is
used in Section 6 to guarantee the existence of 1-day optimal mixed actions in the game Υh.
Indeed, if action sets are finite, then for every history h ∈ H the game Υh is a finite zero-sum
game and hence both players have optimal strategies.
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Appendix A: Universal measurability
This appendix contains a review of the definitions of universally measurable sets, integrals
of universally measurable functions, stopping times, and conditional expectations, as well as
two technical lemmas that are used in the paper.
Universally measurable sets: Let (P,F∞) be a measurable space, where F∞ denotes the
Borel sigma-algebra and let M denote the collection of all probability measures over this
measurable space. For each probability measure P ∈M, we can extend the probability space
(P,F∞,P) to a complete probability space (P,FP,Pc) by including all P-negligible sets. To
be more precise, let
F0P = {Q ⊂ P | ∃Q′ ∈ F∞ such that P(Q′) = 0 and Q ⊆ Q′}
be the set of all subsets of P-negligible sets of F∞. We define
FP = {Q ∪Q0 ⊆ P|Q ∈ F∞ and Q0 ∈ F0P}
and we define Pc : FP → [0, 1] by
Pc(Q ∪Q0) = P(Q), Q ∈ F∞, Q0 ∈ F0P .
It can be shown that (P,FP,Pc) is a probability space. Now define
F =
⋂
P∈M
FP.
It can be shown that F is a sigma-algebra that contains the Borel sigma-algebra F∞ as a
proper subset. The collection F is the universally measurable sigma-algebra and the elements
of F are called universally measurable sets.
Integrals of universally measurable functions: A function u : P → R is called univer-
sally measurable if u−1[a, b] ∈ F for every [a, b] ⊆ R. The class of universally measurable
functions contains the class of Borel measurable functions. Furthermore, for every universally
measurable function there exists a Borel measurable function that coincides with it almost
everywhere.
A function g : P → R is called a simple universally measurable function if it is of the
form g(p) =
∑n
i=1 ciI(p ∈ Zi), where {Z1, . . . , Zn} is a partition of P with Zi ∈ F for all
i = 1, . . . , n. The expected value of a simple universally measurable payoff with respect to a
probability measure P is defined as∫
p∈P
g(p)P(dp) =
n∑
i=1
ciPc(Zi). (A.1)
Let G denote the set of simple universally measurable functions. The expected value of a
bounded universally measurable function u : P → R is then given by∫
p∈P
u(p)P(dp) = sup
g∈G
g≤u
∫
p∈P
g(p)P(dp) = inf
g∈G
g≥u
∫
p∈P
g(p)P(dp). (A.2)
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Stopping times: A stopping time is a function T : P → N ∪ {∞} such that for each t ∈ N
the set {p ∈ P | T (p) = t} is an element of F t. Given a stopping time T , let FT denote the
sigma-algebra of sets A ∈ F∞ such that A ∩ {p ∈ P | T (p) = t} ∈ F t for each t ∈ N.
For every t ∈ N, let Xt be an F t measurable stochastic variable, and let X∞ be an F∞
measurable stochastic variable. The stochastic variable XT is defined by letting it coincide
with Xt on {p ∈ P | T (p) = t} for each t ∈ N and with X∞ on {p ∈ P | T (p) = ∞}.
Following Yeh (1995, Theorem 3.28), it holds that XT is FT measurable.
Conditional expectations: Consider a bounded stochastic variable F : P → R, a strategy
profile (σ, τ) ∈ S1 × S2, and a history h ∈ H` of length `. Let some t ≥ ` be given. The
conditional expectation of F with respect to the sigma-algebra F t and the measurable space
(P,F ,Ph,σ,τ ) is denoted by Eh,σ,τ [F |F t]. The conditional expectation Eh,σ,τ [F |F t] can be
identified with the stochastic variable p 7→ Ep|t,σ,τ [F ].2
In what follows, we make repeatedly use of the following construction: Given a bounded
function f : H → R, we define for each t ∈ N the stochastic variable F t by letting F t(p) =
f(p|t) for each play p ∈ P. Notice that F t is F t measurable.
Lemma A.1. Let f : H → R be a bounded function and let (σ, τ) ∈ S1 × S2 be a strategy
profile. The following two statements are equivalent:
[1] For each t ∈ N and each history h ∈ Ht of length t it holds that Eh,σ,τ [F t+1] ≥ f(h).
[2] For each each history h ∈ H` of length `, the process (F t)t≥` is a Ph,σ,τ -submartingale
with respect to the filtration (F t)t≥`: for each t ≥ `
Eh,σ,τ [F t+1|F t] ≥ F t, Ph,σ,τ -almost surely. (A.3)
Proof. To see that [1] implies [2], take a history h ∈ H` of length ` and time t ≥ `. Take a
play p ∈ P(h). Evaluating the left-hand side of (A.3) at p yields Ep|t,σ,τ [F t+1], which is at
least f(p|t) = F t(p) by condition [1].
To see that condition [2] implies [1] take a t ∈ N and history h ∈ Ht. Take any play
p ∈ P(h). The left-hand side of (A.3) is simply Eh,σ,τ [F t+1]. The right-hand side of (A.3),
evaluated at p, is f(h). Condition [1] follows as Ph,σ,τ is carried by the set P(h).
Lemma A.2 states a version of Levy’s zero-one law for universally measurable functions.
It relies on the fact that a universally measurable function can be approximated by a Borel
measurable function.
Lemma A.2. (Levy’s zero-one law for universally measurable functions) For every strategy
profile (σ, τ) ∈ S1 × S2, for every history h ∈ H, we have
lim
t→∞U
t
σ,τ = u, Ph,σ,τ -almost surely. (A.4)
2As usual, a conditional expectation is not defined uniquely, since some histories might not be reached with
positive probability under the strategy profile (σ, τ). Our particular choice is both convenient and inconsequential,
since any two conditional probability systems coincide Ph,σ,τ -almost surely. We refer to Bogachev (2007, p. 350)
for a careful discussion of conditional expectations.
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Proof. Fix a strategy profile (σ, τ) ∈ S1 × S2 and a history h ∈ H. Since u is universally
measurable, there exists a Borel measurable function u¯ such that u = u¯, Ph,σ,τ -almost surely.
Then
lim
t→∞U
t
σ,τ = lim
t→∞Eh,σ,τ
[
u|F t] = lim
t→∞Eh,σ,τ
[
u¯|F t] = Eh,σ,τ [u¯|F∞] = u¯,
Ph,σ,τ -almost surely. In the first equality we use the definition of the stochastic variable U tσ,τ .
The second equality follows from the fact that u = u¯ Ph,σ,τ -almost surely. The third equality
follows from Levy’s zero-one law (see e.g. Bogachev, 2007, Example 10.3.15). The last equality
follows from the fact that u¯ is F∞ measurable. This is because u¯ is Borel measurable and
F∞ is the Borel sigma-algebra on P. The fact that u = u¯ Ph,σ,τ -almost surely concludes the
proof.
Appendix B: the proof of inequality (6.7)
The following statement follows from the more general result of Theorem 1 in Abate, Redig,
and Tkachev (2014). For completeness, we provide a direct proof in this section.
Lemma B.3. Let σ, σ′ ∈ S1 be such that, for every t ∈ N, for every h ∈ Ht, ‖σ(h) −
σ′(h)‖TV ≤ δt. Then, for every strategy τ ∈ S2, for every t ∈ N, and for every history h ∈ Ht,
‖Ph,σ,τ − Ph,σ′,τ‖TV ≤
∞∑
i=t
δi.
The class V ⊆ F is called an inner (outer) approximating class for the classW ⊆ F if V is
closed under unions (intersections) and if for every  > 0, and for every probability measure
P ∈ M and every set W ∈ W there exists a set V ∈ V such that V ⊆ W (V ⊇ W ) and
|P(W )− P(V )| ≤ .
Lemma B.4. If V is an inner (outer) approximating class for the class W and V ⊆ W, then
it holds for every two probability measures P ∈M and P′ ∈M that
sup
W∈W
|P(W )− P′(W )| = sup
V ∈V
|P(V )− P′(V )|.
Proof. Fix  > 0. Assume that the class V is an inner approximating class for W. The
proof for an outer approximating class is similar. Fix two probability measures P and P′
and a set W ∈ W. Then there exist sets V ∈ V and V ′ ∈ V such that V ⊆ W , V ′ ⊆ W,
|P(W ) − P(V )| ≤ , and |P′(W ) − P′(V ′)| ≤ . Let V˜ = V ∪ V ′. Because V is closed under
unions we have that V˜ ∈ V. Furthermore, it follows trivially that V˜ ⊆W, |P(W )−P(V˜ )| ≤ ,
and |P′(W )− P′(V˜ )| ≤ . We find that
|P(W )− P′(W )| = |P(W )− P(V˜ ) + P(V˜ )− P′(V˜ ) + P′(V˜ )− P′(W )|
≤ |P(W )− P(V˜ )|+ |P(V˜ )− P′(V˜ )|+ |P′(V˜ )− P′(W )|
≤ |P(V˜ )− P′(V˜ )|+ 2.
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Because this holds for any  > 0 and any set W ∈ W, we can conclude that
sup
W∈W
|P(W )− P′(W )| ≤ sup
V ∈V
|P(V )− P′(V )|.
Because V ⊆ W it is clear that:
sup
W∈W
|P(W )− P′(W )| ≥ sup
V ∈V
|P(V )− P′(V )|.
In the following lemma we use Lemma B.4 to simplify the computation of the total vari-
ation norm. Instead of having to compute the supremum over all sets of the universally
measurable sigma-algebra it will be sufficient to compute the supremum over the subclass of
open sets Ot, t ∈ N, defined by
Ot = {∪h∈HP(h)|H ⊆ Ht} (B.5)
The set Ot is the class of open sets such that all the plays sharing a common history at
time t are such that either all or none of them are contained in a specific open set.
Lemma B.5. For every h ∈ H it holds that
‖Ph,σ,τ − Ph,σ′,τ‖TV = sup
t∈N,O∈Ot
|Ph,σ,τ (O)− Ph,σ′,τ (O)|.
Proof. We define O = ∪t∈NOt. Since any set in O is a union of open sets, it holds that O
is a subset of the class of all open sets, O∗. We now show that O is an inner approximating
class for O∗. Fix an open set O∗ ∈ O∗. For every t ∈ N, we define Ot = {p ∈ P|P(p|t) ⊆ O∗}.
It is clear that for every t ∈ N we have Ot ∈ O and Ot ⊆ O∗. Furthermore, we have
that O1 ⊆ O2 ⊆ . . . and O∗ = ∪t∈NOt. For every probability measure P it therefore holds
that lim
t→∞P(O
t) = P(O∗), so for every  > 0 there exists t ∈ N and Ot ∈ Ot such that
|P(O∗)− P(Ot)| < . Hence O is an inner approximating class of O∗.
Because of the outer regularity of Borel measures on metric spaces, we have that the
class of open sets is an outer approximating class for the class of Borel sets. In addition we
have that the class of Borel sets is an inner approximating class for the class of universally
measurable sets. Indeed, for any probability measure and any universally measurable set,
there exists a Borel set which is contained in the universally measurable set and has the same
probability. Repeated application of Lemma B.4 concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma B.3: Fix t ∈ N and a history ht ∈ Ht. We prove by induction that for
every n ≥ t, for every O ∈ On+1,
∣∣Pht,σ,τ (O)− Pht,σ′,τ (O)∣∣ ≤ n∑
i=t
δi. (B.6)
Induction basis (n = t).
We prove that for every O ∈ Ot+1, ∣∣Pht,σ,τ (O)− Pht,σ′,τ (O)∣∣ ≤ δt. Fix a set O ∈ Ot+1. We
define
Zht = {(a, b, x) ∈ A× B × X|P(htabx) ⊆ O}.
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Let Aht = {a ∈ A|∃(b, x) ∈ B × X : (a, b, x) ∈ Zht} be the projection of the set Zht on the
set A. Let xt denote the state at the history ht. We have that
Pht,σ,τ (O) =
∑
(a,b,x)∈Zht
σ(ht)(a) · τ(ht)(b) · q(x|a, b, xt),
Pht,σ′,τ (O) =
∑
(a,b,x)∈Zht
σ′(ht)(a) · τ(ht)(b) · q(x|a, b, xt).
We find that∣∣Pht,σ,τ (O)− Pht,σ′,τ (O)∣∣ = ∣∣∣∑(a,b,x)∈Zht (σ(ht)(a)− σ′(ht)(a)) · τ(ht)(b) · q(x|a, b, xt)∣∣∣
≤ ∑(a,b,x)∈Zht |σ(ht)(a)− σ′(ht)(a)| · τ(ht)(b) · q(x|a, b, xt)
≤ ∑(a,b,x)∈Aht×B×X |σ(ht)(a)− σ′(ht)(a)| · τ(ht)(b) · q(x|a, b, xt)
=
[∑
a∈Aht |σ(ht)(a)− σ
′(ht)(a)|
]
·
[∑
(b,x)∈B×X τ(ht)(b) · q(x|a, b, xt)
]
≤ ∑a∈A |σ(ht)(a)− σ′(ht)(a)| = ‖σ(ht)− σ′(ht)‖TV ≤ δt.
Induction step.
From the induction hypotheses it follows that for every open n-level set On ∈ On with
n− 1 ≥ t,
|Pht,σ,τ (On)− Pht,σ′,τ (On)| ≤
n−1∑
i=t
δi. (B.7)
Fix a set O ∈ On+1. We can assume without loss of generality that Pht,σ,τ (O)−Pht,σ′,τ (O) ≥ 0.
Define
Hn+ = {hn ∈ Hn|Pht,σ,τ (P(hn))− Pht,σ′,τ (P(hn)) ≥ 0}. (B.8)
We have that
Pht,σ,τ (O)− Pht,σ′,τ (O)
=
∑
hn∈Hn Pht,σ,τ (O|P(hn))Pht,σ,τ (P(hn))−
∑
hn∈Hn Pht,σ′,τ (O|P(hn))Pht,σ′,τ (P(hn))
=
∑
hn∈Hn Pht,σ,τ (O|P(hn))Pht,σ,τ (P(hn))−
∑
hn∈Hn Pht,σ,τ (O|P(hn))Pht,σ′,τ (P(hn))
+
∑
hn∈Hn Pht,σ,τ (O|P(hn))Pht,σ′,τ (P(hn))−
∑
hn∈Hn Pht,σ′,τ (O|P(hn))Pht,σ′,τ (P(hn))
=
∑
hn∈Hn Pht,σ,τ (O|P(hn)) ·
(
Pht,σ,τ (P(hn))− Pht,σ′,τ (P(hn))
)
+
∑
hn∈Hn Pht,σ′,τ (P(hn)) ·
(
Pht,σ,τ (O|P(hn))− Pht,σ′,τ (O|P(hn))
)
≤ ∑hn∈Hn+ Pht,σ,τ (O|P(hn)) · (Pht,σ,τ (P(hn))− Pht,σ′,τ (P(hn)))
+
∑
hn∈Hn Pht,σ′,τ (P(hn)) ·
∣∣(Pht,σ,τ (O|P(hn))− Pht,σ′,τ (O|P(hn)))∣∣
≤ ∑hn∈Hn+ (Pht,σ,τ (P(hn))− Pht,σ′,τ (P(hn)))+∑hn∈Hn Pht,σ′,τ (P(hn)) · δn
≤ |Pht,σ,τ (∪hn∈Hn+P(hn))− Pht,σ′,τ (∪hn∈Hn+P(hn))|+ δn
≤ ∑n−1i=t δi + δn = ∑ni=t δi,
where the fact that
∣∣(Pht,σ,τ (O|P(hn))− Pht,σ′,τ (O|P(hn)))∣∣ ≤ δn follows by assumption.
Using Lemma B.5 we can conclude that
‖Pht,σ,τ − Pht,σ′,τ‖TV = supn∈N,O∈On |Pht,σ,τ (O)− Pht,σ′,τ (O)|
= supn≥t,O∈On+1 |Pht,σ,τ (O)− Pht,σ′,τ (O)|
≤ supn≥t
∑n
i=t δi =
∑∞
i=t δi.
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